lock in electronic pattern, illustration - Credit: Diyajyoti / Shutterstock

Fixing the Internet

Aftab Siddiqui, senior manager of Internet technology at the Internet Society, says the initial BGP protocol was conceived by experts at research institutions, defense organizations, and equipment vendors. “When they designed [BGP], it was based on the premise that everybody trusts each other,” Siddiqui says. “Fast-forward 30 years, I’m pretty sure we cannot claim that anymore.”

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Schneier on Security - Masthead

Schneier on Security – “Crypto-Gram” Newsletter

I am a public-interest technologist, working at the intersection of security, technology, and people. I’ve been writing about security issues on my blog since 2004, and in my monthly newsletter since 1998. I’m a Special Advisor to IBM Security, a fellow and lecturer at Harvard’s Kennedy School, and a board member of EFF. This personal website expresses the opinions of none of those organizations.

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Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice

Communications of the ACM, January 2019, Vol. 62 No. 1, Pages 106-114
Research Highlights: “Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice”
By David Adrian, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, et al.

“We investigate the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange as used in popular Internet protocols and find it to be less secure than widely believed.”

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